The Economics of Taking Less—and how different capital terms can create different economic outcomes.
In 1970, Milton Friedman published an essay that would profoundly shape how we think about the purpose of business and its responsibility to generate profits. Entitled “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” the essay has influenced economic thinking and corporate decision-making for more than five decades. Its relevance may be particularly significant today, as artificial intelligence companies approach what could become one of the largest investment and valuation events in economic history, while simultaneously facing increasingly consequential questions about the safety and broader implications of their products.
In Rogé Karma’s recent Atlantic article, he talks about how “the company’s pitch to investors depends on pursuing the very strategy that it warns could lead to human extinction.” Be that as it may, is it Anthropic’s pursuit of profits that leads it down a perilous path and away from its original, more altruistic purpose, or as Friedman argues, must Anthropic do what is necessary because of the kind of capital it seeks to power its activities and growth? We often evaluate the decisions companies make without examining the financial expectations and constraints shaping those decisions. The people running a company make choices, but the capital behind the company influences the choices that are economically possible. How much responsibility should we assign to each—and what could change if capital providers deliberately chose different terms?
Many readers will see the title of Friedman’s essay and immediately take a position for or against his argument. But I think that misses something much more interesting. If we look beyond the title and examine what Friedman actually wrote, we find an important idea that deserves considerably more attention: the recognition that the owners of capital can choose to pursue objectives beyond maximizing financial returns. I believe there is an enormous opportunity embedded in that idea—one that we have yet to fully explore. And it begins with a different way of thinking about what capital can accomplish when its owners choose to take less.
There is an important distinction here. Friedman was principally concerned with the responsibility of corporate executives to the owners whose capital they manage. But he also recognized that owners themselves could choose to pursue objectives other than maximizing financial returns. That distinction matters. If the owners of capital have the freedom to choose objectives beyond maximizing financial returns, then the question becomes much broader than whether a business should maximize profits. It becomes a question of how capital owners can deliberately structure their investments to produce outcomes they value.
In the first essay, I asked a simple question: What if capital could make more possible?
That question challenges a familiar assumption about money: that its purpose is to earn the highest return the market will allow.
For investors, that assumption has a certain logic. Capital is scarce. Investing involves risk. Returns compensate investors for committing their resources rather than using them elsewhere. In many circumstances, seeking a competitive return is entirely reasonable.
But what if maximizing financial return is not always the same as maximizing what capital can accomplish?
What if an investor could choose to take less—and, by doing so, make something possible that otherwise would not happen?
This is the idea behind Agentic Capital: deploying capital intentionally, with attention not only to the return it earns, but also to the outcomes its terms can enable.
The question is not whether investors should always accept less. It is what happens when they choose different terms, why those terms matter, and whether the resulting outcomes justify the choice.
To answer that, we need to understand the economics of taking less.
Capital does more than provide money
When we talk about capital, we often focus on its quantity: how much money is invested, borrowed, or made available.
But capital is never just an amount of money. It also comes with terms.
An investor may require a particular return, demand certain protections, expect repayment within a specific period, or insist on a particular share of future value. A lender may charge a certain interest rate. An equity investor may require a target return and a defined ownership stake.
These terms determine how the economic benefits of an activity are divided—and can influence whether the activity happens at all.
Consider a business that needs financing to grow. It may have customers, a viable product, and an opportunity to expand. But the cost of borrowing could make the expansion too risky or leave too little cash to operate successfully.
Now imagine a lender willing to offer the same amount of capital on more favorable terms.
The money has not changed. The business has not necessarily changed. But the economic conditions surrounding the opportunity have.
That difference is where the economics of taking less begins.
A simple example: the cost of capital
Imagine a business borrows $1 million.
Under one loan agreement, it pays 10% annual interest. Under another, it pays 5%. For simplicity, assume the principal remains the same, the rates are fixed, and there are no differences in fees, repayment structure, or other loan terms.
At 10%, annual interest is $100,000.
At 5%, annual interest is $50,000.
The difference is $50,000 a year.
That $50,000 is a real financial benefit to the borrower. It is also a $50,000 reduction in the lender’s interest income. At this point, however, we have demonstrated a change in the distribution of value—not the creation of additional economic value. For this comparison, we are assuming the lower interest rate does not come with a corresponding increase in fees, restrictions, collateral requirements, or risk transferred to the borrower.
But what has actually been accomplished?
The answer is not yet clear.
The business might use the money to hire another employee, purchase equipment, improve its product, or build a reserve that helps it survive a difficult period.
It might also use the money to pay existing expenses, increase the owner’s compensation, or simply retain more cash.
Some of those choices may create value beyond the immediate benefit to the borrower. Others may primarily change who receives the value generated by the existing business.
And the lower interest rate does not guarantee that the business will grow, hire anyone, or become more productive.
Taking less changes the economic terms. What happens next determines whether that change creates additional value.
That distinction is essential.
Three different outcomes
These three outcomes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. These describe different stages or dimensions of what can happen when capital terms change. A concession may transfer value to the recipient. It may also change a decision by making an activity economically feasible. If that activity produces benefits that would not otherwise have existed, additional value may be created. The important task is to distinguish the financial transfer from the economic consequences that follow.
1. Value is transferred
The most straightforward outcome is a transfer.
The lender receives less interest. The borrower keeps more money.
The borrower is better off financially, all else being equal. The lender receives less than it otherwise would have. But the transaction has not necessarily created additional economic value. It may simply have changed who receives it.
Transfers can matter. They can improve financial stability, reduce pressure on a household, or give a business owner greater freedom. The distribution of economic resources is not irrelevant.
But a transfer should not automatically be described as economic creation.
If we want Agentic Capital to be more than a new label for generosity, we must be precise about the difference.
2. Value is enabled
A second possibility is that the lower cost of capital makes a productive activity possible.
Return to the business borrowing $1 million. Suppose its expansion can generate enough revenue to cover operating costs and the 5% loan, but not enough to cover the 10% loan while maintaining a reasonable margin of safety.
At the higher rate, the business does not expand.
At the lower rate, it does.
The difference in financing terms may enable the business to hire employees, serve additional customers, or introduce a product that would otherwise never reach the market.
In this case, the concession does more than shift money from lender to borrower. It changes the conditions under which a decision is economically viable.
The critical phrase is may enable. We would still need to establish that the lower financing cost actually influenced the decision. If the business would have expanded anyway, the lower rate may provide a benefit without being the reason the expansion occurred.
That is why the counterfactual matters: What would have happened under the original terms?
3. Additional value is created
A third possibility is that the change in financing terms helps produce economic value that would not otherwise have existed.
Perhaps the business expands, employs people who would otherwise have remained unemployed, develops a more productive process, or brings a useful service to a new market. The business may benefit, employees may earn income, and customers may gain access to something they value.
Some of those benefits may be reflected in the business’s financial results. Others may accrue to people outside the transaction.
But we should not simply add every benefit together and declare the total a return on the capital concession. We need to distinguish value that is genuinely additional from value that would have been created anyway, and we need to consider costs, risks, and who actually benefits.
The central test is straightforward:
Did the different terms of capital cause an outcome that would not otherwise have occurred—and was the value of that outcome greater than the cost of the concession?
That is a much more demanding question than whether the borrower paid less interest.
It is also a more useful one.
What conventional finance analysis may leave out
Conventional financial analysis is designed to evaluate the financial consequences of deploying capital. It is exceptionally good at answering questions about return, risk, liquidity, and repayment. But those measures do not necessarily capture the full range of economic and social outcomes that different financing terms might produce. This is not a criticism of financial analysis. It is a recognition that the questions we build into a model determine the outcomes we are able to see.
The limitation is not that financial return is unimportant. It is that financial return and the full range of outcomes a transaction can produce are not the same thing.
A financial model may tell an investor which of two opportunities offers the higher expected return. It may not tell the investor whether accepting a lower return in one opportunity could make a socially valuable project feasible, preserve a business through a difficult period, or enable a more productive use of resources.
Those outcomes may be outside the model’s purpose. They may be difficult to measure, accrue to someone other than the investor, or never appear on the investor’s balance sheet.
That does not make them imaginary. Nor does it mean they should automatically override financial considerations.
It means the decision may require another question alongside the traditional ones.
Not only: What return can I earn?
But also: What can my capital make possible under different terms?
For capital allocators, this is an invitation to examine the full set of choices available to them. Could a different interest rate, ownership structure, repayment schedule, risk allocation, or investment horizon change the feasibility of an opportunity?
For everyone else, it is a way to understand why the terms attached to money matter. The same amount of capital can have different consequences depending on what it requires in return and how those requirements shape the decisions of the people using it.
Agentic Capital begins with the recognition that these terms are choices—and that choices have consequences.
The hard part: proving the difference
There is a danger in this idea.
Once we decide that capital can serve a broader purpose than maximizing financial return, it becomes tempting to assume that any concession is beneficial. Lower interest rates, smaller profits, longer repayment periods, or reduced investor returns can all sound like progress.
But the intention to create value is not proof that value was created.
A lender might accept a lower rate without changing the borrower’s behavior. An investor might sacrifice return for a project that would have proceeded on the same terms without that concession. A business might receive cheaper financing and use it in ways that produce no additional benefit beyond the money saved.
In each case, the capital provider gave something up. That alone does not establish additional impact.
A serious approach to Agentic Capital must therefore ask four questions:
First, what was the concession?
How much financial return, control, security, or other economic claim did the capital provider voluntarily relinquish compared with a credible alternative accounting for differences in risk, time, and other terms?
Second, what changed because of it?
Did the recipient make a different decision, undertake an activity that was previously unviable, or achieve an outcome that would not otherwise have occurred?
Third, what additional value resulted?
Who benefited, how much value was created, and what costs or negative consequences accompanied the outcome? In this case we are interested in net additional outcomes, not just visibility. There’s a meaningful difference between reporting twenty new hires and demonstrating twenty net additional jobs. To measure the latter, we would need to consider whether employees moved from other positions, whether positions were filled, and whether the hiring actually increased total employment.
Fourth, how confident can we be that the concession caused the result?
What would likely have happened without the different capital terms? Was the concession decisive, one of several contributing factors, or largely irrelevant?
These questions will not always have easy answers. Real economic activity is complicated, and causation is rarely perfect.
But the difficulty of measurement is not a reason to abandon the test. It is a reason to be careful about the claims we make.
If we cannot distinguish a transfer from an enabled outcome, or an enabled outcome from additional value, we cannot reliably know whether taking less accomplished what we intended.
Taking less is a means, not an end
The phrase taking less can sound like a moral instruction: that investors should want less, that profit is inherently suspect, or that financial discipline should give way to good intentions.
That is not the argument.
Capital has legitimate costs. Investors must consider risk, liquidity, time, and the alternatives available to them. Some opportunities will not justify a concession. Some concessions will be too small to change an outcome. Others will be unnecessary because the desired activity would happen anyway.
There will also be situations where accepting a lower return is not the best way to achieve the intended result. A different financing structure, a different allocation of risk, or a different use of capital may accomplish more.
Agentic Capital does not require capital to take less in every transaction. It asks capital providers to consider whether the terms they choose are aligned with what they want their capital to accomplish.
Sometimes, the right answer will be to pursue the highest available financial return.
Sometimes, it will be to accept less because doing so makes a valuable activity possible.
And sometimes, the answer will be that taking less makes no meaningful difference at all.
The point is to make that choice deliberately—and to evaluate it honestly.
A different way to evaluate capital
Imagine evaluating an investment with two related sets of questions.
The first is familiar: What financial return can the capital earn? What risks does it carry? How likely is repayment? What alternatives are available?
The second asks what the capital can make possible: What outcome is intended? Could different terms change the decisions of the people using the money? What additional value might result? How would we know whether the outcome occurred because of those terms?
These questions do not have to compete. In fact, they can make each other more useful.
Understanding the financial return being relinquished helps establish the cost of the concession. Measuring the additional outcomes helps determine whether that concession was worthwhile. Together, these questions provide a more disciplined basis for comparing investment opportunities.
That is the possibility Agentic Capital seeks to explore.
The question worth asking
Capital is already shaping economic outcomes. It does to through the returns it demands, the risk it accepts, the time horizons it imposes, and the claims it makes on future values. Those terms are not inevitable. They are choices.
Agentic Capital begins with the idea that we can make those choices more deliberately—and measure what becomes possible as a result. Taking less is not the goal. Creating more value is.
The question is not whether capital should always take less. It is whether we have fully considered what capital could make possible if we choose to deploy it differently.
Choose to Make It.