What Happens When Capital Chooses Not to Take Everything It Can?

The Economics of Taking Less—and how different capital terms can create different economic outcomes.

In 1970, Milton Friedman published an essay that would profoundly shape how we think about the purpose of business and its responsibility to generate profits. Entitled “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” the essay has influenced economic thinking and corporate decision-making for more than five decades. Its relevance may be particularly significant today, as artificial intelligence companies approach what could become one of the largest investment and valuation events in economic history, while simultaneously facing increasingly consequential questions about the safety and broader implications of their products.

In Rogé Karma’s recent Atlantic article, he talks about how “the company’s pitch to investors depends on pursuing the very strategy that it warns could lead to human extinction.” Be that as it may, is it Anthropic’s pursuit of profits that leads it down a perilous path and away from its original, more altruistic purpose, or as Friedman argues, must Anthropic do what is necessary because of the kind of capital it seeks to power its activities and growth? We often evaluate the decisions companies make without examining the financial expectations and constraints shaping those decisions. The people running a company make choices, but the capital behind the company influences the choices that are economically possible. How much responsibility should we assign to each—and what could change if capital providers deliberately chose different terms?

Many readers will see the title of Friedman’s essay and immediately take a position for or against his argument. But I think that misses something much more interesting. If we look beyond the title and examine what Friedman actually wrote, we find an important idea that deserves considerably more attention: the recognition that the owners of capital can choose to pursue objectives beyond maximizing financial returns. I believe there is an enormous opportunity embedded in that idea—one that we have yet to fully explore. And it begins with a different way of thinking about what capital can accomplish when its owners choose to take less.

There is an important distinction here. Friedman was principally concerned with the responsibility of corporate executives to the owners whose capital they manage. But he also recognized that owners themselves could choose to pursue objectives other than maximizing financial returns. That distinction matters. If the owners of capital have the freedom to choose objectives beyond maximizing financial returns, then the question becomes much broader than whether a business should maximize profits. It becomes a question of how capital owners can deliberately structure their investments to produce outcomes they value.

In the first essay, I asked a simple question: What if capital could make more possible?

That question challenges a familiar assumption about money: that its purpose is to earn the highest return the market will allow.

For investors, that assumption has a certain logic. Capital is scarce. Investing involves risk. Returns compensate investors for committing their resources rather than using them elsewhere. In many circumstances, seeking a competitive return is entirely reasonable.

But what if maximizing financial return is not always the same as maximizing what capital can accomplish?

What if an investor could choose to take less—and, by doing so, make something possible that otherwise would not happen?

This is the idea behind Agentic Capital: deploying capital intentionally, with attention not only to the return it earns, but also to the outcomes its terms can enable.

The question is not whether investors should always accept less. It is what happens when they choose different terms, why those terms matter, and whether the resulting outcomes justify the choice.

To answer that, we need to understand the economics of taking less.

Capital does more than provide money

When we talk about capital, we often focus on its quantity: how much money is invested, borrowed, or made available.

But capital is never just an amount of money. It also comes with terms.

An investor may require a particular return, demand certain protections, expect repayment within a specific period, or insist on a particular share of future value. A lender may charge a certain interest rate. An equity investor may require a target return and a defined ownership stake.

These terms determine how the economic benefits of an activity are divided—and can influence whether the activity happens at all.

Consider a business that needs financing to grow. It may have customers, a viable product, and an opportunity to expand. But the cost of borrowing could make the expansion too risky or leave too little cash to operate successfully.

Now imagine a lender willing to offer the same amount of capital on more favorable terms.

The money has not changed. The business has not necessarily changed. But the economic conditions surrounding the opportunity have.

That difference is where the economics of taking less begins.

A simple example: the cost of capital

Imagine a business borrows $1 million.

Under one loan agreement, it pays 10% annual interest. Under another, it pays 5%. For simplicity, assume the principal remains the same, the rates are fixed, and there are no differences in fees, repayment structure, or other loan terms.

At 10%, annual interest is $100,000.

At 5%, annual interest is $50,000.

The difference is $50,000 a year.

That $50,000 is a real financial benefit to the borrower. It is also a $50,000 reduction in the lender’s interest income. At this point, however, we have demonstrated a change in the distribution of value—not the creation of additional economic value. For this comparison, we are assuming the lower interest rate does not come with a corresponding increase in fees, restrictions, collateral requirements, or risk transferred to the borrower.

But what has actually been accomplished?

The answer is not yet clear.

The business might use the money to hire another employee, purchase equipment, improve its product, or build a reserve that helps it survive a difficult period.

It might also use the money to pay existing expenses, increase the owner’s compensation, or simply retain more cash.

Some of those choices may create value beyond the immediate benefit to the borrower. Others may primarily change who receives the value generated by the existing business.

And the lower interest rate does not guarantee that the business will grow, hire anyone, or become more productive.

Taking less changes the economic terms. What happens next determines whether that change creates additional value.

That distinction is essential.

Three different outcomes

These three outcomes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. These describe different stages or dimensions of what can happen when capital terms change. A concession may transfer value to the recipient. It may also change a decision by making an activity economically feasible. If that activity produces benefits that would not otherwise have existed, additional value may be created. The important task is to distinguish the financial transfer from the economic consequences that follow.

1. Value is transferred

The most straightforward outcome is a transfer.

The lender receives less interest. The borrower keeps more money.

The borrower is better off financially, all else being equal. The lender receives less than it otherwise would have. But the transaction has not necessarily created additional economic value. It may simply have changed who receives it.

Transfers can matter. They can improve financial stability, reduce pressure on a household, or give a business owner greater freedom. The distribution of economic resources is not irrelevant.

But a transfer should not automatically be described as economic creation.

If we want Agentic Capital to be more than a new label for generosity, we must be precise about the difference.

2. Value is enabled

A second possibility is that the lower cost of capital makes a productive activity possible.

Return to the business borrowing $1 million. Suppose its expansion can generate enough revenue to cover operating costs and the 5% loan, but not enough to cover the 10% loan while maintaining a reasonable margin of safety.

At the higher rate, the business does not expand.

At the lower rate, it does.

The difference in financing terms may enable the business to hire employees, serve additional customers, or introduce a product that would otherwise never reach the market.

In this case, the concession does more than shift money from lender to borrower. It changes the conditions under which a decision is economically viable.

The critical phrase is may enable. We would still need to establish that the lower financing cost actually influenced the decision. If the business would have expanded anyway, the lower rate may provide a benefit without being the reason the expansion occurred.

That is why the counterfactual matters: What would have happened under the original terms?

3. Additional value is created

A third possibility is that the change in financing terms helps produce economic value that would not otherwise have existed.

Perhaps the business expands, employs people who would otherwise have remained unemployed, develops a more productive process, or brings a useful service to a new market. The business may benefit, employees may earn income, and customers may gain access to something they value.

Some of those benefits may be reflected in the business’s financial results. Others may accrue to people outside the transaction.

But we should not simply add every benefit together and declare the total a return on the capital concession. We need to distinguish value that is genuinely additional from value that would have been created anyway, and we need to consider costs, risks, and who actually benefits.

The central test is straightforward:

Did the different terms of capital cause an outcome that would not otherwise have occurred—and was the value of that outcome greater than the cost of the concession?

That is a much more demanding question than whether the borrower paid less interest.

It is also a more useful one.

What conventional finance analysis may leave out

Conventional financial analysis is designed to evaluate the financial consequences of deploying capital. It is exceptionally good at answering questions about return, risk, liquidity, and repayment. But those measures do not necessarily capture the full range of economic and social outcomes that different financing terms might produce. This is not a criticism of financial analysis. It is a recognition that the questions we build into a model determine the outcomes we are able to see.

The limitation is not that financial return is unimportant. It is that financial return and the full range of outcomes a transaction can produce are not the same thing.

A financial model may tell an investor which of two opportunities offers the higher expected return. It may not tell the investor whether accepting a lower return in one opportunity could make a socially valuable project feasible, preserve a business through a difficult period, or enable a more productive use of resources.

Those outcomes may be outside the model’s purpose. They may be difficult to measure, accrue to someone other than the investor, or never appear on the investor’s balance sheet.

That does not make them imaginary. Nor does it mean they should automatically override financial considerations.

It means the decision may require another question alongside the traditional ones.

Not only: What return can I earn?

But also: What can my capital make possible under different terms?

For capital allocators, this is an invitation to examine the full set of choices available to them. Could a different interest rate, ownership structure, repayment schedule, risk allocation, or investment horizon change the feasibility of an opportunity?

For everyone else, it is a way to understand why the terms attached to money matter. The same amount of capital can have different consequences depending on what it requires in return and how those requirements shape the decisions of the people using it.

Agentic Capital begins with the recognition that these terms are choices—and that choices have consequences.

The hard part: proving the difference

There is a danger in this idea.

Once we decide that capital can serve a broader purpose than maximizing financial return, it becomes tempting to assume that any concession is beneficial. Lower interest rates, smaller profits, longer repayment periods, or reduced investor returns can all sound like progress.

But the intention to create value is not proof that value was created.

A lender might accept a lower rate without changing the borrower’s behavior. An investor might sacrifice return for a project that would have proceeded on the same terms without that concession. A business might receive cheaper financing and use it in ways that produce no additional benefit beyond the money saved.

In each case, the capital provider gave something up. That alone does not establish additional impact.

A serious approach to Agentic Capital must therefore ask four questions:

First, what was the concession?

How much financial return, control, security, or other economic claim did the capital provider voluntarily relinquish compared with a credible alternative accounting for differences in risk, time, and other terms?

Second, what changed because of it?

Did the recipient make a different decision, undertake an activity that was previously unviable, or achieve an outcome that would not otherwise have occurred?

Third, what additional value resulted?

Who benefited, how much value was created, and what costs or negative consequences accompanied the outcome? In this case we are interested in net additional outcomes, not just visibility. There’s a meaningful difference between reporting twenty new hires and demonstrating twenty net additional jobs. To measure the latter, we would need to consider whether employees moved from other positions, whether positions were filled, and whether the hiring actually increased total employment.

Fourth, how confident can we be that the concession caused the result?

What would likely have happened without the different capital terms? Was the concession decisive, one of several contributing factors, or largely irrelevant?

These questions will not always have easy answers. Real economic activity is complicated, and causation is rarely perfect.

But the difficulty of measurement is not a reason to abandon the test. It is a reason to be careful about the claims we make.

If we cannot distinguish a transfer from an enabled outcome, or an enabled outcome from additional value, we cannot reliably know whether taking less accomplished what we intended.

Taking less is a means, not an end

The phrase taking less can sound like a moral instruction: that investors should want less, that profit is inherently suspect, or that financial discipline should give way to good intentions.

That is not the argument.

Capital has legitimate costs. Investors must consider risk, liquidity, time, and the alternatives available to them. Some opportunities will not justify a concession. Some concessions will be too small to change an outcome. Others will be unnecessary because the desired activity would happen anyway.

There will also be situations where accepting a lower return is not the best way to achieve the intended result. A different financing structure, a different allocation of risk, or a different use of capital may accomplish more.

Agentic Capital does not require capital to take less in every transaction. It asks capital providers to consider whether the terms they choose are aligned with what they want their capital to accomplish.

Sometimes, the right answer will be to pursue the highest available financial return.

Sometimes, it will be to accept less because doing so makes a valuable activity possible.

And sometimes, the answer will be that taking less makes no meaningful difference at all.

The point is to make that choice deliberately—and to evaluate it honestly.

A different way to evaluate capital

Imagine evaluating an investment with two related sets of questions.

The first is familiar: What financial return can the capital earn? What risks does it carry? How likely is repayment? What alternatives are available?

The second asks what the capital can make possible: What outcome is intended? Could different terms change the decisions of the people using the money? What additional value might result? How would we know whether the outcome occurred because of those terms?

These questions do not have to compete. In fact, they can make each other more useful.

Understanding the financial return being relinquished helps establish the cost of the concession. Measuring the additional outcomes helps determine whether that concession was worthwhile. Together, these questions provide a more disciplined basis for comparing investment opportunities.

That is the possibility Agentic Capital seeks to explore.

The question worth asking

Capital is already shaping economic outcomes. It does to through the returns it demands, the risk it accepts, the time horizons it imposes, and the claims it makes on future values. Those terms are not inevitable. They are choices.

Agentic Capital begins with the idea that we can make those choices more deliberately—and measure what becomes possible as a result. Taking less is not the goal. Creating more value is.

The question is not whether capital should always take less. It is whether we have fully considered what capital could make possible if we choose to deploy it differently.

Choose to Make It.

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What If Capital Could Make More Possible?

It’s October 2026 and every day we talk about how expensive housing is in America. The housing cost burden has gone beyond someone having something and wanting something better. It’s not complaining, it is very real. It is an economic problem. The Harvard Joint Center on Housing details all the ways Americans are feeling the costs of housing in their daily life in their recent report, but let’s zoom out for one moment before we get deep into the data and think about what happens when people cannot comfortably afford a place to live. That’s not good. When people cannot afford a place to live, we need to think about where they will go, what will they do, and how will that impact the greater whole of society. Housing is the specific need I am going to use to explain a new theory I am developing called, the Economics of Taking Less.

I believe essential things have gotten very expensive because we have only relied on conventional markets to give society some of the things it needs for basic survival and therefore, its flourishing. Housing is an essential item that has specifically risen in cost because of the conventional market behavior. We usually ask how to provide more housing with existing financial structures. What if we also question the financial terms those structures require? The terms on which capital is provided can affect which projects are financially feasible, how much revenue they require, and who benefits from the resulting economics. Focusing on the terms is a practical action we can take but it must be done outside of the conventional market.

I believe we need a new market—not a replacement—but a complement to what we have currently to help deliver things more affordably for Americans so they can live more stable, productive, and fulfilling lives. When we think about markets, money and investing, we’ve relied too much on the simple idea of what can I get for my money? Or said more simply: What’s the most I can get? We need a new market that is more ambitious, one that asks, what can my money make possible?

Finance can be complicated, and housing finance is even more so. I am not going to try and simplify all of finance here, but I am going to spend time laying out an approach that simplifies how housing can be financed which can help simplify everyday Americans’ finances. To do this I am introducing Agentic Capital, the approach to deploying capital intentionally, and with the agency inherent in the terms of capital itself: what return is required, what risks are acceptable, how long the capital stays invested, what claims it makes, and what outcomes its structure is designed to enable. Agentic Capital is more than conventional. It is capital that harnesses the power of its ability to choose its terms.

The idea begins with a simple premise: capital does not have to seek the highest possible financial return to be successful.

An investor can deliberately accept a lower return in exchange for making a greater outcome possible. That outcome might be more affordable homes, a larger number of people served, or a more efficient system.

But accepting less is not enough. We must be able to demonstrate that the decision actually created additional value compared with what would have happened otherwise.

The question is not simply how much return the investor gave up. It is what that choice made possible—and whether the resulting value exceeded the cost of the concession. This is the foundation of the Economics of Taking Less and the fundamental infrastructure for the Agentic Capital Market.

The housing crisis has forced Americans to confront the consequences of not building enough housing to meet demand. The consequences extend beyond housing itself: they affect the American economy, trust in the American Dream, and stagnated American ambition.

Who knew that underinvesting in building houses could have such far-reaching effects? We do. Now.

So what if we approached the problem differently?

Why is housing so expensive now? The short answer is because too many people rely on a historical rate of financial return which drives up the cost of building new housing through the process of actually building the buildings. In many projects, the return requirement by investors contributes to the cost of building housing. If we can change that expectation in exchange for a measured outcome, we may be able to lower the cost of delivering housing and pass that cost savings on to residents. Housing requires substantial upfront capital, and the financing terms affect what it costs to deliver. What if some investors or lenders were willing to accept less financial return in exchange for a measurable outcome, such as more homes built or lower rents?

Building buildings costs a lot of money, it is very capital intensive. There’s a lot of risk involved. However, what if we looked at the cost of that capital as a design choice rather than an unquestioned industry constraint. Right now, every actor involved in the process to build a building expects to make a certain amount of money in exchange for doing the work. Good. Great even. That works. That works because they are building buildings to make money. Making money is the goal. What if this other approach had the goal of increasing the supply of total housing across America. What if we designed our approach to achieve that greater supply and structured the financing accordingly to achieve this goal.

By decreasing the cost of capital necessary to build buildings, meaning lowering the expected returns for lenders and investors, could we change the feasibility, affordability, and ability to scale home building across America? This is a hypothesis I am testing through my work at The Affordability Project. I believe we can make it work, and my experience is giving me reasons to pursue it. The next step is to measure what changes, how much it changes, and why. If we set a different goal and achieve it, we are still undeniably successful. We just have to choose to do it.

Here’s my proposition for a new goal to increase the supply of affordable housing: Accept less financial return when doing so can create additional measurable value—and keep that value working toward the intended outcome.

Consider a hypothetical housing development that requires outside investment. To be clear—these investors are taking a big risk and are usually the first ones to do it. Under conventional financial terms, the investor requires a return that contributes significantly to the project’s overall cost.

What if some of those investors were willing to accept a lower return in exchange for a measurable outcome, such as lower rents or more homes built?

The difference between the conventional return and the agreed-upon return could reduce the project’s financing costs. If that savings is passed through to the project, it could make homes more affordable, reduce the need for subsidy, or help finance additional housing.

But none of those outcomes is guaranteed. The savings might instead increase the developer’s profit, or the lower cost of capital might not materially change the project at all. This is precisely what Agentic Capital must measure: what changed because the investor chose to take less, and what additional value did that choice create?

An investor’s decision to accept less may create additional economic value and social value—but only if the concession changes an outcome and the additional value can be demonstrated. This is the core of my economic theory. Agentic Capital—again, the activation of capital using this theory–asks a specific question: when an investor voluntarily accepts a lower financial return, what additional economic and social value does that decision create compared with what would otherwise have happened?

Every investment is a choice about the future. We choose where capital goes, what return it must produce, how long it remains invested, and what it makes possible along the way.

What if we judged some investments not only by what they return to the investor, but also by what they make possible for everyone else?

Could accepting less financial return help build more affordable housing, improve educational outcomes, or reduce homelessness? And could we measure whether it actually works?

Those are the questions I want to explore through the Economics of Taking Less and Agentic Capital.

The goal is not to abandon markets. It is to discover what markets can accomplish when we deliberately choose the outcomes we want capital to create.

Capital is not just something we accumulate. It is something we put to work in shaping the future.

We can choose to make it work differently.

Choose to Make It.

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Common Good Capital–What if philanthropy could build housing differently?

In 2023 Tim Szarnicki wrote “Civic Viability–the return on altruistic investment” paper arguing for a new capital class that looked to achieve altruistic returns over market rate returns. As he worked to finance The Affordability Project’s inaugural project at 5250 3rd Street, he saw that middle-income earners (80-130% AMI) were not able to pay enough for housing to meet market rate returns on construction capital and equity and that all the incentives in the forms of tax credits, subsidies, and tax expeditions we designed mainly for projects built for people earring incomes of 80% AMI and below. On August 4th, 2026, The San Francisco Chronicle made the announcement, in this article celebrating JPMorgan’s $200M bet on housing in San Francisco.

The article mentions the Essential Housing Fund, a private investment vehicle focused on workforce housing run by Fifth Space. Crankstart One of The Affordability Project’s key partners, was one of the first investors. Missy Narula, CEO of Crankstart, explains the fund saying, “the fund was not designed for investors seeking outsized returns: Its goal is to demonstrate that housing serving the city’s middle class can also be a viable investment.” She added, “If you care about building the kind of housing that will house the people who sustain our city, it’s a great investment.”

We are honored to partner with people on the cutting edge of thinking about innovative capital. Business as usual works for what it is designed to do. But business as usual, on its own, has not produced affordability at the scale the shortage demands. If it could, the gap would not be three to four million homes. Unless we are willing to add an option. Not a replacement for the market. A complement to it. A for the Common Good Capital option earns a place only if it competes on quality and on business fundamentals, and only if its ambition matches the size of the problem. It requires philanthropists, social impact investors, and mission-aligned landowners, developers, and contractors willing to build a different model together.

Fundamentally, we believe housing has become unaffordable because of capital market failures. When the cost of capital is associated with maximizing returns, the middle-income earner cannot pay enough to achieve traditional expected returns. Our approach is similar to Wal-Mart’s strategy: negotiate hard to drive down costs, pass the cost savings to consumer, and then focus on volume. The Affordability Project, a 501(c)(3) organization, is not interested in developer fees or maximizing individual deal returns, we are focused on our mission to increase the long-term supply of housing of the people who ensure our communities’ civic and economic viability.

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